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TO GRIGORI MINTS Z”L IN MEMORIAM
Abstract. We observe that some natural mathematical definitions are lifting properties relative
to simplest counterexamples, namely the definitions of surjectivity and injectivity of maps, as well
as of being connected, separation axioms T0 and T1 in topology, having dense image, induced
(pullback) topology, and every real-valued function being bounded (on a connected domain).
We also offer a couple of brief speculations on cognitive and AI aspects of this observation,
particularly that in point-set topology some arguments read as diagram chasing computations
with finite preorders.
2. Hawk/Goose effect. A baby chick does not
have any built-in image of “deadly hawk” in its
head but distinguishes frequent, hence, harmless
shapes, sliding overhead from potentially
dangerous ones that appear rarely. Similarly to
“first”, “frequent” and “rare” are universal
concepts that were not specifically designed by
evolution for distinguishing hawks from geese.
This kind of universality is what, we believe, turns
the hidden wheels of the human thinking
machinery.
Misha Gromov, Math Currents in the Brain.
1. Introduction. Structure of the Paper
This note was written for the De Morgan Gazette [DMG] to show that some natural
definitions are lifting properties relative to the simplest counterexample, and to suggest a
way to “extract” these lifting properties from the text of the usual definitions and proofs.
The exposition is in the form of a story and aims to be self-contained and accessible to a first
year student who has taken some first lectures in naive set theory, topology, and who has
heard a definition of a category. A more sophisiticated reader may find it more illuminating
to recover our formulations herself from reading either the abstract, or the abstract and
the opening sentence of the next section. The displayed formulae and Figure 1(a) defining
the lifting property provide complete formulations of our theorems to such a reader.
Our approach naturally leads to a more general observation that in basic point-set
topology, a number of arguments are computations based on symbolic diagram chasing
with finite preorders likely accessible to a theorem prover; because of lack of space, we
discuss it in a separate note [G0].
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2. Surjection and injection
We try to find some “algebraic” notation to (re)write the text of the definitions of
surjectivity and injectivity of a function, as found in any standard textbook. We want
something very straightforward and syntactic — notation for what we (actually) say, for
the text we write, and not for its meaning, for who knows what meaning is anyway?
(*)words “A function f from X to Y is surjective iff for every element y of Y there is an
element x of X such that f(x) = y.”
A function from X to Y is an arrow X −→ Y . Grothendieck(?) taught us that a point,
say “x of X”, is (better viewed as) as {•}-valued point, that is an arrow {•} −→ X from
a(the?) set with a unique element; similarly “y of Y ” we denote by an arrow {•} −→ Y .
Finally, make dashed the arrows required to “exist”. We get the diagram Fig. 1(b) without
the upper left corner; there “{}” denotes the empty set with no elements listed inside of
the brackets.
(**)words “A function f from X to Y is injective iff no pair of different points is sent to the
same point of Y .”
“A function f from X to Y ” is an arrow X −→ Y . “A pair of points” is a {•, •}-valued
point, that is an arrow {•, •} −→ X from a two element set; we ignore “different” for now.
“the same point” is an arrow {•} −→ Y . Represent “sent to” by an arrow {•, •} −→ {•}.
What about “different”? if the points are not “different”, then they are ”the same” point,
that is an arrow {•} −→ X.
Now all these arrows combine nicely into diagram Figure 1(c). How do we read it? We
want this diagram to have the meaning of the sentence (**)words above, so we interpret
such diagrams as follows:
(i) “for every commutative square (of solid arrows) as shown there is a diagonal
(dashed) arrow making the total diagram commutative” (see Fig. 1(a))
(recall that “commutative” in category theory means that the composition of the arrows
along a directed path depends only on the endpoints of the path)
Property (i) has a name and is in fact quite well-known [Qui]. It is called the lifting
property, or sometimes orthogonality of morphisms, and is viewed as the property of the
two downward arrows; we denote it by i.
Now we rewrite (*)words and (**)words as:
(∗)i {} −→ {•}iX −→ Y
(∗∗)i {•, •} −→ {•}iX −→ Y
So we rewrote these definitions without any words at all. Our benefits? The usual little
miracles happen:
Notation makes apparent a similarity of (*)words and (**)words: they are obtained, in the
same purely formal way, from the two simplest arrows (maps, morphisms) in the category of
Sets. More is true: it is also apparent that these arrows are the simplest counterexamples to
the properties, and this suggests that we think of the lifting property as a category-theoretic
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(a) A
i //
f

X
g

B
j
//
j˜
>>
Y
(b) {} //
.

X
∴

{•} //
>>
Y
(c) {•, •} //
.

X
∴

{•} //
==
Y
(d) X //
∴

{x, y}
.

Y //
;;
{x = y}
Figure 1. Lifting properties. Dots ∴ indicate free variables, i.e. a property of
what is being defined. (a) The definition of a lifting property f i g: for each
i : A −→ X and j : B −→ Y making the square commutative, i.e. f ◦ j = i ◦ g,
there is a diagonal arrow j˜ : B −→ X making the total diagram A f−→ B j˜−→ X g−→
Y,A
i−→ X,B j−→ Y commutative, i.e. f ◦ j˜ = i and j˜ ◦ g = j. (b) X −→ Y is
surjective (c) X −→ Y is injective; X −→ Y is an epicmorphism if we forget that
{•} denotes a singleton (rather than an arbitrary object and thus {•, •} −→ {•}
denotes an arbitrary morphism Z unionsq Z (id,id)−−−−→ Z) (d) X −→ Y is injective, in the
category of Sets; pi0(X) −→ pi0(Y ) is injective, in the category of topological spaces.
(substitute for) negation. Note also that a non-trivial (=non-isomorphism) morphism never
has the lifting property relative to itself, which fits with this interpretation.
Now that we have a formal notation and the little observation above, we start to play
around looking at simple arrows in various categories, and also at not-so-simple arrows
representing standard counterexamples.
You notice a few words from your first course on topology: (i) connected, (ii) the sep-
aration axioms T0 and T1, (iii) dense, (iv) induced (pullback) topology, and (v) Hausdorff
are, resp.,
(i) : X −→ {•}i {•, •} −→ {•}
(ii) : {• ≷ ?} −→ {•}iX −→ {•} and {• < ?} −→ {•}iX −→ {•}
(iii), (iv) : X −→ Y i {•} −→ {• → ?} and X −→ Y i {• < ?} −→ {•}
(v) : {•, •′} −→ X i {• > ? < •′} −→ {•}
See the last two pages for illustrations how to read and draw on the blackboard these lifting
properties in topology (here {• < ?}, {• ≷ ?}, ... denote finite preorders, or, equivalently,
finite categories with at most one arrow between any two objects, or finite topological
spaces on their elements or objects, where a subset is closed iff it is downward closed (that
is, together with each element, it contains all the smaller elements). Thus {• < ?}, {• ≷ ?}
and {• > ? < •′} −→ {•} denote the connected spaces with only one open point •, with
no open points, and with two open points •, •′ and a closed point ?. Line (v) is to be
interpreted somewhat differently: we consider all the arrows of form {•, •′} −→ X).
We mentioned that the lifting property can be seen as a kind of negation. Confusingly,
there are two negations, depending on whether the morphism appears on the left or right
side of the square, that are quite different: for example, both the pullback topology and the
separation axiom T1 are negations of the same morphism, and the same goes for injectivity
and injectivity on pi0 (see Figure 1(c,d)).
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Now consider the standard example of something non-compact: the open covering R =⋃
n∈N
{x : −n < x < n } of the real line by infinitely many increasing intervals. A related
arrow in the category of topological spaces is
⊔
n∈N
{x : −n < x < n} −→ R. Does the
lifting property relative to that arrow define compactness? Not quite but almost:
{} −→ X i
⊔
n∈N
{x : −n < x < n } −→ R
reads, for X connected, as “Every continuous real-valued function on X is bounded”, which
is an early characterisation of compactness taught in a first course on analysis.
A category theorist would rewrite (**)i as
(∗∗)mono •∨• −→ • i X −→ Y
denoting by ∨ and • ∨ • −→ • the coproduct and the codiagonal morphism, resp., and
then read it as follows: given two morphisms • left−−→ X and • right−−−→ X, if the compositions
• left−−→ X −→ Y = • right−−−→ X −→ Y are equal (both to • down−−−→ Y ), then • left−−→
X = • right−−−→ X are equal (both to • down−−−→ X). Naturally her first assumption would
be that • denotes an arbitrary object, as that spares the extra effort needed to invent
the axioms particular to the category of sets (or topological spaces) that capture that •
denotes a single element, i.e. allow to treat • as a single element. (A logician understands
“arbitrary” as “we do not know”, “make no assumptions”, and that is how formal derivation
systems treat “arbitrary” objects.) Thus she would read (**)i as the usual category
theoretic definition of a monomorphism. Note this reading doesn’t need that the underlying
category has coproducts: a category theorist would think of working inside a larger category
with formally added coproducts • ∨ •, and a logician would think of working inside a
formal derivation system where “ • ” is either a built-in or “a new variable” symbol, and
“ • ∨ • −→ • ” (or “ {•, •} −→ {•} ”) is (part of) a well-formed term or formula.
And of course, nothing prevents a category theorist to make a dual diagram
(∗∗)epi X −→ Y i • −→ • × •, • runs through all the objects
and read it as:
X −→ Y left−−→ • = X −→ Y right−−−→ • implies Y left−−→ • = Y right−−−→ •
which is the definition of an epimorphism.
3. Speculations.
Does your brain (or your kitten’s) have the lifting property built-in? Note [G0] suggests a
broader and more flexible context making contemplating an experiment possible. Namely,
some standard arguments in point-set topology are computations with category-theoretic
(not always) commutative diagrams of preorders, in the same way that lifting properties
define injection and surjection. In that approach, the lifting property is viewed as a rule
to add a new arrow, a computational recipe to modify diagrams. Moreover, this and some
other computations coming from standard theorems in point-set topology do not involve
automorphisms and thus may perhaps be decidable by an algorithm [GLS] or a modification
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thereof. Can one find an experiment to check whether humans subconsciously use diagram
chasing to reason about topology? Does it appear implicitly in old original papers and
books on point-set topology? Would teaching diagram chasing hinder or aid development
of topological intution in a first course of topology? Say if one defines connected, dense,
Hausdorff et al via the lifting properties (i-v)?
Is diagram chasing with preorders too complex to have evolved? Perhaps; but note the
self-similarity: preorders are categories as well, with the property that there is at most
one arrow between any two objects; in fact sometimes these categories are thought of as
0-categories. So essentially your computations are in the category of (finite 0-) categories.
Is it universal enough? Diagram chasing and point-set topology, arguably a formalisation
of “nearness”, is used as a matter of course in many arguments in mathematics.
Finally, isn’t it all a bit too obvious? Curiously, in my experience it’s a party topic people
often get stuck on. If asked, few if any can define a surjective or an injective map without
words, by a diagram, or as a lifting property, even if given the opening sentence of the
previous section as a hint. No textbooks seem to bother to mention these reformulations
(why?). An early version of [GH-I] states (*)i and (**)i as the simplest examples of
lifting properties we were able to think up; these examples were removed while preparing
for publication.
No effort has been made to provide a complete bibliography; the author shall happily
include any references suggested by readers in the next version [G].
Acknowledgments and historical remarks. It seems embarrassing to thank anyone for ideas
so trivial, and we do that in the form of historical remarks. Ideas here have greatly influ-
enced by extensive discussions with Grigori Mints, Martin Bays, and, later, with Alexander
Luzgarev and Vladimir Sosnilo. At an early stage Ksenia Kuznetsova helped to realise an
earlier reformulation of compactness was inadequate and that labels on arrows are nec-
essary to formalise topological arguments. “A category theorist [that rewrote] (**) as”
the usual category theoretic definition of a monomorphism, is Vladimir Sosnilo. Exposi-
tion has been polished in the numerous conversations with students at St.Peterburg and
Yaroslavl’2014 summer school.
Reformulations (*)i and (**)i of surjectivity and injectivity, as well as connectedness
and (not quite) compactness, appeared in early drafts of a paper [GH-I] with Assaf Hasson
as trivial and somewhat curious examples of a lifting property but were removed during
preparation for publication. After (**)i came up in a conversation with Misha Gromov
the author decided to try to think seriously about such lifting properties, and in fact gave
talks at logic seminars in 2012 at Lviv and in 2013 at Munster and Freiburg, and a seminar
in 2014 at St.Petersburg. At a certain point the author realised that possibly a number of
simple arguments in point-set topology may become diagram chasing computations with
finite topological spaces, and Grigori Mints insisted these observations be written. Ideas
of [ErgB] influenced this paper (and [GH-I] as well), and particularly our computational
approach to category theory. Alexandre Borovik suggested to write a note for [DMG]
explaining the observation that ‘some of human’s “natural proofs” are expressions of lifting
properties as applied to “simplest counterexample”’.
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